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ABSTRACT 
Studies that have addressed questions concerning when framing effects are 
likely to occur have produced mixed results. In this article we examine 
how differences in personality factors influence a group–based framing 
task. Specifically, when high collective importance individuals evaluated 
a framing task involving their group no framing effects were observed. Different 
results were obtained for low collective individuals. When low collective 
individuals evaluated a task involving their group, the typical 
framing effects were found. These results are interpreted in light of the dual 
analytic-holistic analysis. 
  
Most people agree that preference for one option over another 
should remain constant regardless of whether the options are presented 
positively, in terms of gains, or negatively, in terms of 
losses. Yet, as a large body of research demonstrates, people do 
tend to change their preferences based on how the alternatives are 
presented. This change, or preference reversal, has become 
known as framing. 
The framing phenomenon, as derived from prospect theory 
(Kahneman &Tversky, 1979), has become the most widely tested 
example of irrational decision–making. For over two decades investigations 
in numerous research domains have tested and applied 
this phenomenon—proof of its viability and its ability to 
stimulate interest. Most of the framing tasks investigated follow 
the standard risky-choice format similar to the Asian disease 
problem (see Appendix 1). However, not all research has been 
supportive and the framing effect seems to be plagued with a 
number of inconsistencies (see Kuhberger, 1998 and Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998 for reviews). 
 
For example, Fagley and Miller (1990) investigated how personal 
factors of risk–taking predisposition and sex would affect 
the strength of framing. Their overall findings suggested a 
weaker framing effect for males and an unclear relationship for 
risk–taking predisposition which seemed to be obscured by the 
situation or “arena” of presentation. Following these findings, 
Schneider (1992) proposed that differences in aspiration accounted 
for the lack of consistency between framing arenas. 
 
Further research investigating the framing phenomenon demonstrated 
that person factors such as need for cognition 
(Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg & France, 2000; Smith & Levin, 1996; 
Zhang & Buda, 1999), perceptions of threat (Highhouse & Yuce, 
1996; Highhouse & Paese, 1996), individual perceptions (Frisch, 
1993) and personality traits including intuition (Levin, Gaeth & 
Schreiber, 2002) can all effect the likelihood of framing. Similar to 
person factors, a number of contextual factors have also been 
shown to affect the potential for framing. Examples include statistical 
versus medical context (Bless, Betsch & Franzen 1998), decision 
time (Takemura, 1992), target of the task (Levin&Chapman, 
1990, Wang, 2001) and presentation format (Fagley & Miller, 
1997). Attesting to much of this inconsistency, Kuhberger (1998) 
found in a meta–analytic review of framing research that the 
overall effect for framing was relatively small (d = 0.33). The 
strongest framing effect seemed to be found with scenarios that 
most closely followed the Asian disease problem (see Appendix 
1) and, not surprisingly, some types of framing scenarios seemed 
to produce no framing effects at all. 
 
DUAL–PROCESS APPROACH 
 
In recent decades, researchers investigating various psychological 
phenomena have developed numerous dual–process models 
(e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein&Huh, 1992; Johnson– 
Laird & Byrne, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo 1986; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). The focus of this research has spanned across both social 
and cognitive psychology. Because of the extensive history of 
the dual–processing approach, it has been the foundation for a 
large number of studies that have demonstrated its potency. Consequently, 
it remains one of the most investigated and important 
frameworks in social psychology (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999 for 
review). 
 
While most dual–process models focus on specific topics and 
have theoretically identifying characteristics, they nonetheless 
maintain a central theme. They posit that two distinct processing 
modes or systems exist. One system requires relatively more effort 
and performs a more comprehensive analysis of the information. 
While the other system requires relatively less effort and, 
consequently, performs a less extensive analysis of the 
information. 
 
 
ANALYTIC/HOLISTIC DISTINCTION 
 
Recently, McElroy and Seta (2003, 2004) proposed a dual–process 
account to explain some of the discrepancies found within the 
framing literature. According to this view, individuals process 
decision tasks using both analytic and holistic processing styles. 
In a typical decision task, either the analytic or holistic processing 
style can be particularly influential depending upon personality, 
relevance and hemispheric factors. 
 
Consistent with prior dual–process theories (e.g., Chaiken, 
1987; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein & Huh, 1992; Johnson–Laird & 
Byrne, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo 1986; Stanovich & West, 2000), the 
analytic/holistic model proposes two systems of processing that 
operate under different principles. Although most individuals 
typically operate under the less effortful–holistic processing 
style, several factors can either induce or predispose individuals 
to process a task using the more effortful–analytic processing 
style. When the task is of sufficiently high relevance, the more 
effortful, analytic system is induced whereas if the task is of low 
personal relevance, the less effortful–holistic system is induced. 
Further, both systems have a personality component that can predispose 
individuals to one or the other systems of processing. 
 
Demonstrating these points, McElroy and Seta (2003) found that 
when participants were given the traditional Asian disease problem 
(see Appendix 1), typical framing effects occurred only when 
the task was presented as being of relatively low personal relevance 
or when individuals had a personality predisposition 
favoring holistic thought (McElroy & Seta, 2003). 
 
The analytic/holistic account differs from prior dual–processing 
accounts in two fundamental ways. First, the analytic/holistic 
model suggests that, in addition to effort and personality factors, the 
functional specializations of the respective hemispheres provide a 
representative basis for the two system of processing (McElroy & 
Seta, 2004). The left hemisphere represents the analytic system 
whereas the right hemisphere represents the holistic system. 
The analytic/holistic view differs further from other dual–process 
models in the functionality of the two systems. The analytic 
system focuses on breaking information down into distinct and 
unconnected elements, then combining this information and focusing 
on quantitative weights for solutions. The holistic system 
differs from other accounts primarily because of “contextual referencing”— 
the holistic system is especially sensitive to cues 
within the surrounding context. The contextual cues then act to 
elicit a framework within which the problem can be evaluated. 
This process is largely derived from work investigating language 
comprehension (e.g., Brownell, Pincus, Blum, Rehak, & Winner, 
1997). 
 
According to the dual analytic–holistic approach then, if a person 
identifies the target of a framing task as an important identifying 
aspect of their self–construct, then related information should 
be of especially strong personal relevance. Consequently, individuals 
should process the task with the more effortful–analytic 
processing style and the predicted framing effects should not occur. 
Conversely, if the target of the task is not particularly tied to 
their self–construct, then personal relevance should be low and 
the less effortful–holistic style should be selected. This should re- 
sult in special sensitivity to contextual cues (i.e., the frame) and 
commonly found framing effects should occur. One way that individuals 
differ in their self– identifying attachments is in their 
identity orientation toward groups. 
 
 
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
 
While we each hold individual aspects of our selves central to our 
personal self–view, we also have aspects of our self that are related 
to groups we encounter (family, faculty, swim clubs etc.). 
Research examining this differentiation (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 
1996; Cheek 1989; Seta, Seta & Hundt, 2001) supports the view 
that this “group” aspect of our self has a unique importance to our 
self–concept—separate from individual aspects of our self. Consequently, 
both personal and collective identities can have differential 
effects on a person’s evaluation (Long, Spears &Manstead, 
1998). The construct that reflects the importance of social groups 
to an individual’s self–concept is collective identity (Luhtanen & 
Crocker 1992). 
 
As with most individual traits, individual levels of collective identity 
vary from person to person (e.g., Cheek, 1989; Luhtanen & 
Crocker 1992). And because collective identity is such an important 
aspect of an individual’s self–concept, it is not surprising that those 
individuals with high levels of collective identity will be especially 
prone to group bias (e.g., Rubin & Hewstone 1998). For example, 
Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) found that high collective individuals 
were more likely to enhance their in group after receiving failure. 
Therefore, both theoretical and empirical findings support the 
claim that individuals differ in their levels of collective identity. 
And, because collective identification is the determining factor 
for level of importance in a group related task, we can make certain 
overall predictions about the likelihood of framing influences 
on a group–based risky–choice framing task. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF A GROUP–BASED TASK 
 
Based on the dual analytic–holistic analysis (McElroy & Seta, 
2003), when a decision task is of relatively low importance, in- 
dividuals should process the task with the less effortful, holistic 
processing style. Therefore, individuals who have a low 
level of collective identification should evaluate a task involving 
their group as being less important and engage the task 
with amore holistic processing style. As a result, low collective 
individuals should be especially sensitive to contextual cues 
(i.e., the frame) and the commonly found framing effects 
should occur. 
 
Amuch different type of response can be predicted for those individuals 
who have a high level of identification with groups. 
Consistent with the analytic–holistic analysis, when the decision 
task is of relatively high importance, individuals should rely 
upon the more effortful, analytic processing style. And because 
high collective individuals perceive group–relevant information 
as being of greater personal importance, they should process a 
framing task involving their group with the more effortful–analytic 
style of processing. Therefore, high collective individuals 
evaluating a framing task involving their group should not 
demonstrate the predicted framing effects. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
 
In order to investigate the analytic/holistic predictions for a 
group based, gain/loss framing task, we measured individuals’ 
own personality predispositions and manipulated the framing of 
the task. We constructed the task so that individuals were faced 
with a typical risk–no risk choice paradigm involving their own 
school. Prior to the presentation of the decision task, each individual’s 
level of collective importance was determined using a 
collective identity scale. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants and Design. The participants in this study were 94 
female introductory psychology students. All females were used 
for reasons of homogeneity and because they represented the majority 
of the subject pool. 
We measured each individual’s level of group identification by 
using a collective identity scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Participants 
were then randomly assigned to either the gain or loss 
framing condition. This yielded a 2–way factorial design of Collective 
Importance (high, low) X Frame (gain, loss). 
 
Procedure and Materials. Upon arrival, participants were informed 
that they would be asked their opinion on several items. 
They were then instructed that they should turn each item face 
down on the desk in front of them after they had completed it. 
 
Participantswere first presented with the Luhtanen and Crocker 
(1992) collective identity scale. This scale consists of 16 items and is 
a well validated means for assessing collective identity (Luhtanen 
& Crocker, 1992). After they had finished the collective identity 
scale, participants were presented with the group framing task. 
 
The group framing task was adapted from materials used in 
prior framing research (Fagley & Miller 1990). In the initial vignette, 
participants were told: 
 
Imagine that UNCG has projected that 1000 students will drop out of 
school during the next year. Two programs have been proposed to address 
this problem, but only one can be implemented. Based on UNCG’s experiences 
with the programs, estimates of the outcomes that can be expected 
from each program can be made. Assume for purposes of this decision that 
these estimates of the outcomes are accurate and are as follows: 
 
Participants were then presented with the risk and no risk 
choices, framed as either gains or losses (losses condition presented 
in parentheses). For the no–risk option participants were 
told that: 
 
If program 1 is adopted, 400 of the 1000 students will stay in (drop out 
of) school. 
 
In the risk option, participants were told that: 
 
If program 2 is adopted there is 2/5 chance that all 1000 students will 
stay in (drop out of) school and 3/5 chance that none of the 1000 will 
stay in (drop out of) school. 
  
After participants had completed the group framing task they 
were properly debriefed and dismissed. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Because our central hypothesis revolves around how personal 
importance of the decision task can motivate different styles of 
processing, the importance subscale of the Luhtanen Crocker 
(1992) collective identity scale has direct theoretical and methodological 
advantages for our investigation. Therefore, we focused 
our analysis on the collective importance subscale.1 We also performed 
a subsequent analysis, exploring individual’s responses 
at differing levels of overall collective esteem. We categorized 
participants as being either high or low on collective identity importance. 
This division was based on a median split of collective 
importance scores. A similar median–split categorization was 
used to classify participants as high or low on overall collective 
identity. 
 
To test whether framing effects would be affected by individuals 
level of collective importance and the target group, we performed 
a 2 (high/low collective importance) x 2 (gain/loss 
framing) nominal logistic chi–square analysis on participant’s decisions. 
The results of our analysis, as may be seen in Table 1, revealed 
a main effect for framing χ2 (1, N = 94) = 9.46, p < .01. This 
effect, however, was qualified by a collective importance × framing 
interaction, χ2 (1, N = 94) = 4.47, p < .05. This interaction suggests 
that participants’ responses depended upon both the 
gain/loss framing manipulation as well as participants own level 
of collective identity importance. To test further our hypothesis 
and access the influence of framing more specifically, we performed 
a nominal logistic chi–square analysis of participant’s 
decisions within both of the collective identity conditions. 
 
According to our predictions, participants who have a high 
level of collective importance and evaluate a task involving their 
group should engage the information with the more effortful–analytic 
processing style and, as a result, they should be relatively 
insensitive to the way in which the decision is framed. As expected, 
a nominal logistic chi–square analysis of participants’ de- 
cisions in the high collective importance condition did not reveal 
a framing effect, X2 (1, N = 47) = .12, p > .7. 
 
 
 
 
Further exploration of our hypothesis involves those individuals 
Who have a relatively low level of importance for groups. According 
to our hypothesis these individuals should engage the task with the 
less effortful–holistic processing style and be sensitive to the frame. 
The analysis of low collective importance participants’ decisions did 
reveal the typical framing effect X2 (1, N = 47) = 9.46, p < .003. 
We concentrated our analysis on the importance subscale of the 
Luhtanen Crocker collective identity scale because of its direct 
relevance to our investigation. Although less precise, we also performed 
an analysis on the overall collective scale. As may be seen 
in Table 2, this analysis revealed a main effect for framing χ2 (1, N 
= 94) = 6.24, p < .01 and a nonsignificant overall collective identity 
× framing interaction X2 (1, N = 112) = 2.48, p <.12. However, the 
pattern of results was similar to those obtained with the collective 
importance subscale (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In this study we found that the individuals’ own level of importance 
for the target of the task systematically affected their choices 
for risk–seeking or risk–avoiding options. Specifically, the proxi- 
mal relationship between the target and the persons own identity 
was the determining factor for the presence or absence of a framing 
effect. We found that those individuals who had high levels of 
collective importance demonstrated no framing effects for a framing 
task involving their group. Conversely, those individuals 
who had low levels of collective importance did express the 
typical framing effect for the same group–based task. 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Research investigating the framing phenomenon has provided 
mixed results as to its viability across some situational and personal 
factors. The present study was designed to investigate how 
processing of a group–based decision task is influenced by 
group–relevant personal factors (i.e., collective esteem). Our experiment 
was also designed to test the predictive power of a potential 
explanatory mechanism, the dual analytic–holistic 
approach (McElroy & Seta 2003, 2004). 
 
In this study, we found that for individuals who attached high 
importance to their collective identification, the framing task was 
especially important when it involved their in group. As a result 
of this high level of importance, these individuals processed the 
in group framing task with the more effortful, analytic processing 
style and as a result, no framing effects were observed. 
Our investigation also yielded interesting results about those 
individuals who have relatively low collective importance for 
groups. Because of the low level of importance that these individuals 
have for groups, they engaged the decision task involving 
their group with the less effortful, holistic processing style and 
were especially sensitive to contextual cues found in the frame. 
As a result, low collective individuals demonstrated the 
predicted framing effects. 
 
 
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS 
 
In our study we examined how the importance of a group, via collective 
identity, affected individual responses to a group–based, 
risky–choice framing problem. The risky–choice framing task that 
we employed is the foremost studied type of framing task 
(Kuhberger, 1998).However, there are other methods of framing situations. 
In fact, Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) differentiate between 
three unique types of framing. Because, as Levin et al. 
demonstrate, these typologies are unique; our conceptual analysis 
would have to be adapted to fit situations other than the risk–choice 
framework. 
 
For example, one type of framing, often utilized in health situations, 
is what Levin Schneider and Gaeth (1998) term “goal framing.” 
In an often cited example, Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) 
found that for the task of breast self–examination (presumably a task 
of high importance),participants who received a negatively–framed 
message were more likely to have positive attitudes about and actually 
perform breast self–examination relative to participants who received 
a positively framed message. Similar findings have also 
occurred for attitudes Wegener, Petty & Klein (1994). 
 
Comparing across the two typologies one specific difference is 
that goal framing does not normally elaborate on alternatives. 
Consequently, the expected value associated with the message 
cannot be determined (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). In contrast to 
the risky–choice framing where the alternatives are laid out in numeric 
and probability format for analytic comparison, goal framing 
alternatives have no objective information that can be 
analytically processed. Consequently, numeric comparison of the 
alternatives is not possible. 
 
Another limitation could involve group membership. Specifically, 
does the importance of a group–based task only occur when 
an individual is a member of the targeted group? In our study 
participants were all members of the targeted group they were 
evaluating so we cannot say if this translates to groups in general. 
However, research by Seta et al. (2001) demonstrates that high 
collective individuals have a perceptual bias toward groups that 
extends to groups they do not belong to or have affiliation with. 
This research suggests that high collective individuals may show 
similar results for framing tasks involving groups that they have 
no affiliation with. However, it seems likely that increased 
effortful evaluation is more likely when high collective 
individuals own in group is involved. 
 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
An important implication that emerges from our study is that personality 
differences can differentially affect a group–based decision. 
For example, consider a hypothetical individual who has the task of 
deciding between potential projects or initiatives that have different 
degrees of potential risk for their local community. According to our 
findings, the personality predispositions of the individual may have 
very real influences on the decision choices they make. In accordance 
with our findings, we would predict that if our hypothetical 
individual has a low collective importance for groups; she should 
then be more influenced by peripheral factors, such as how the information 
is presented. In other words, if the two alternative projects 
were presented in such a way that focused on the potential losses, 
we would suggest that she would be more willing to choose a risky 
project. Conversely, this individual should be more likely to choose 
the risk free project if the two alternatives were presented by 
potential gains that could be accomplished. 
 
Alternatively, different predictions can be made for an individual 
who has a high level of collective–esteem importance. According to 
our findings, if our high collective hypothetical individual is presented 
with a similar situation then, she should be relatively less in- 
fluenced by how the options are being presented (positively or 
negatively) and more influenced by analytically derived elements of 
the alternatives. For example, weighting the potential value of each 
potential outcome by its probability of occurrence (e.g., Program X 
with expected value of 17,000 and Program Y with expected value of 
20,004) and make her decision based upon this analysis. 
 
It would seem from our analysis then, that under the above circumstances, 
optimal decisions for group–based choices should 
include both individuals who have a high level of collective importance 
as well as those individuals who have a low level of collective 
importance for the group. This should make available both 
holistically based (i.e., contextual information) as well as more analytically 
based information for the group decision task. 
 
NOTE 
1. Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) have validated the use of specific subscales for more specific 
measurements of the scales components.  
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